

act:onaid

The 20 Billion Dollar Question:

Have the G8 delivered on their hunger pledge?

June 2010

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

“There is an urgent need for decisive action to free humankind from hunger and poverty. We therefore agree to act with the scale and urgency needed to achieve sustainable global food security...”

“L’Aquila” Joint Statement on Global Food Security, 2009¹

Last year, as the number of hungry people in the world topped one billion, G8 leaders made a bold pledge of US \$22 billion² to support developing country farmers and fight hunger.

The pledge to support smallholder agriculture was one of the biggest and most important the G8 has made in years. With one in three of the world’s children chronically malnourished - the underlying cause of half of all child deaths – never before has it been more urgent or more necessary for world leaders to deliver a rescue plan on hunger.

However, one year on, the details of the US \$22 billion L’Aquila initiatives remain shrouded in mystery. Disentangling genuinely new spending from the repackaging of existing commitments is fiendishly complex. But ActionAid’s analysts can find no proof of an overall increase in funds to the agricultural sector. New money committed to agriculture by some countries, is being offset by reductions in spending from other countries. The US has made significant new pledges in aid to agriculture. But decreases by others, such as Japan and the EU, are pulling down the overall G8 record.

At their 2010 summit, the G8 leaders’ credibility is on the line. In the midst of announcing yet more new initiatives, it is vital they prove they can deliver on their 2009 promise to “act with the scale and urgency needed to achieve global food security.”

There are some clear areas for action. First and foremost, in the midst of continued economic uncertainty, G8 leaders must not turn their back on the commitments made in the L’Aquila pledge. They must clearly spell out the answer to the 20 billion dollar question: when will these funds be disbursed and how will they be invested?

Second, in every country the G8 and other donors must pool efforts and get behind a single, government-led plan to end hunger. The current patchwork of disconnected projects that is called aid to agriculture is badly in need of modernisation. At worst, it cannot even be called aid.

Particularly shocking are the instances that ActionAid uncovered of non-food spending masquerading as agricultural aid. For instance, Germany has reported money to support biofuels production in South Africa, as a contribution to food security, despite overwhelming evidence that the scramble for biofuels is diverting huge amounts of crop land away from food production.

Spain included patrol boats for the Nicaraguan Navy in its aid to the agriculture, forests and fisheries sector. Although ostensibly intended to enforce fishing laws (and therefore technically admissible under aid reporting rules), it seems unlikely that the boats will make much contribution to Prime Minister Zapatero's stated priority of fighting hunger.

The news is not all bad. Some countries, such as the US, are not only increasing their commitments, but are also putting their money behind a coordinated multilateral approach to supporting country led agriculture plans. Others must follow suit. The L'Aquila pledge, if delivered and delivered well, has the potential to be a pathway out of poverty and hunger for millions.

Recommendations

In Canada, the G8 must:

1. Establish a clear and transparent timeline for the delivery of the full US \$22bn pledged in L'Aquila.
2. Announce a plan to operationalise the coordinated, comprehensive and country-led approach promised in L'Aquila, so as to ensure that every dollar and Euro spent has the maximum impact on hunger.
3. Work with developing countries to ensure that the stated focus on smallholders and women is translated into reality and support is shifted to low-cost, sustainable techniques.
4. Pledge support for developing an action-oriented and funded global plan for ending hunger at the UN summit on the Millennium Development Goals in September 2010.

1. WHAT'S IN A PLEDGE? THE G8 FOOD SECURITY PROMISE

As the hunger crisis deepened in 2009 and the numbers of hungry swelled to their highest ever recorded levels, the G8 meeting in L'Aquila made a bold pledge. The 'L'Aquila Food Security Initiative', backed by 27 countries and 14 international agencies, saw donors pledge to mobilise over US \$20 billion over three years in support of country-led plans for agriculture, with a 'coordinated, comprehensive strategy' that would focus on supporting smallholder and women farmers to increase production through sustainable means.³

The L'Aquila pledge also signalled an important shift in the policies of some G8 countries, which tended to neglect smallholder agriculture, while constantly increasing emergency food aid. Triggered by the food crisis, it seemed that donors were finally beginning to acknowledge that the world needed to re-invest in smallholder agriculture. One year on, the G8 are due to meet again and will be accounting on delivery to date. In the following brief, ActionAid takes a look at what can be ascertained from data available about the G8's record around the US \$22 billion pledge.

2. THE L'AQUILA COMMITMENT: HOPE FOR THE WORLD'S HUNGRY?

Malnutrition is the underlying cause of over half of the 8.8 million under-five deaths each year.⁴ Children who are malnourished in the early years of life are 12 times more likely to die from easily preventable and treatable diseases, as a result of impaired immune systems.⁵ Hunger and malnutrition also plays a role in one in five maternal deaths.⁶

Growing hunger and malnourishment in the wake of the food and financial crises is not only morally unacceptable but poses a grave threat to progress on many other Millennium Development Goals – such as the commitment to reduce maternal deaths and child deaths by two-thirds by 2015.

Nearly one in three of the world's children are growing up chronically malnourished,⁷ and three-quarters of Africa's malnourished live on small farms.⁸ An overwhelming 70 per cent of hungry people live in rural communities.⁹ It is now recognised that improving the lot of smallholder-based rural communities is essential to ending poverty and hunger.¹⁰

According to the 2010 UN Secretary General's report on progress towards the MDGs, an increase in agricultural productivity can accomplish several things simultaneously: reduced hunger; reduced child mortality through improved nutrition; reduced maternal mortality through improved nutrition and; higher household incomes and economic growth.¹¹

According to the World Bank, new investment in agriculture in Africa will not only help meet the demand for food, it will boost the continent's overall economic growth. GDP growth originating in

agriculture is more than twice as effective in reducing poverty as growth deriving from other sectors, meaning that agriculture is also a long term path out of poverty.¹²

If countries were fully supported by donors in meeting their targets for regenerating smallholder agriculture, national poverty would fall from 68 to 52 per cent in Zambia in the next four years and from 59 per cent to 42 per cent in Rwanda. Similarly, a 6 per cent growth rate in the agricultural sector in Mozambique would halve hunger by 2015¹³.

Supporting smallholder agriculture, specifically, is also central to generating income and tackling poverty.¹⁴ Smallholders feed poor communities – including themselves – and small increases in yields on their farms could have a profound impact on poverty and access to food.¹⁵ Yet small farmers have been systematically ignored for decades by governments and donors alike.

3. REALTY CHECK: PROGRESS ON THE L'AQUILA PLEDGE.

The L'Aquila pledge of US \$22 billion over three years was a welcome boost towards increasing agricultural aid, which had plummeted by 68 per cent over the previous twenty years, from a high of almost US \$9bn,¹⁶ to a low of less than US \$3bn in 2003. The total volume of aid to agriculture has increased significantly over the last few years, to the tune of nearly US \$5bn in 2008. But in spite of the recovery, aid to agriculture remained below 4.5 per cent in 2008, still far from the average levels recorded in the 1980s (over 10 per cent).¹⁷

If it represented genuinely new money, the L'Aquila initiative would transform this gloomy picture. However, less than a third of the pledge appears to be additional funds (see Box 1 for more details). To date, there is no official information on what has actually been spent in countries and whether governments are holding true to their commitments.

What is most staggering is, that in spite of the hype surrounding new funds for agriculture, there is no proof of an increase in funds for the agricultural sector, over and above figures for the 2006-2008 period – and several signatories are actually reducing their aid to agriculture.

New money committed by some countries is being offset by reductions in spending from other countries. So, for instance, the US has made significant new pledges in aid to agriculture, with a commitment to spend over US \$1 billion extra. Others have made modest increases, such as Germany, France, Canada and the UK. However, these increases are pulled down by reductions from the EU and Japan, while other countries contributions remain stagnant.

What is clear is that some countries have stepped up to the plate and are committing ambitious amounts to agriculture and other food security initiatives. Many more are simply not doing enough. ActionAid has taken a look at each country's contribution to the overall US \$20 billion pledge, assessed what areas are new and additional funding and then highlighted the areas going to agriculture. The next section takes a look at the leaders and laggards.¹⁸

Box One: What's in the L'Aquila pledge?¹⁹

According to official figures, the pledge amounts to a total of US \$22.2bn – higher than the US \$20 billion which was originally pledged in the G8 Summit in L'Aquila in 2009. Of this, only US \$6.1bn would be additional funds. Less than half of the funds (only around US \$9bn) will be targeted at the agricultural sector.

A significant amount of money is expected to be used to pursue other objectives, which, despite having overlap with food security, may include a significantly wider range of unrelated objectives.

Around US \$2.3bn is being allocated to diverse categories which make up a hotchpotch of spending. Depending on the country concerned, these may include school feeding programmes, rural water supply and sanitation, land mine clearance, rural energy supply, rural business support services, and environmental protection in rural areas.

The G8 leaders and laggards *²⁰

The Chair of this year's G8 Summit, **Canada**, has performed well on its commitment to the L'Aquila US \$20 billion. Stephen Harper announced new and additional commitments and also pledged to double aid to agriculture at the L'Aquila Summit in 2009. If these pledges are fully implemented, Canada will probably become the first country to fulfil the commitment to double aid to Africa by 2010, made at Gleneagles in 2005.²¹ The country has already met the target in current terms, but it is still US \$400m short once inflation is taken into account.²² However, Canada has recently announced cuts in overall aid giving next year, making it possible that they may renege on the L'Aquila commitment.

France has also made a good effort towards delivering the L'Aquila US \$22 billion. Funds pledged represent a 35 per cent increase over previous year's spending. Also in Nicolas Sarkozy's favour is the fact that lion's share of this money is being directed towards agriculture.

Meanwhile, **Germany** pledged US \$3bn for food security, representing an additional US \$1bn. If delivered over the pledged period, this money would represent a 66 per cent increase over previous years. However, a closer examination suggests that Germany might be doing some clever accounting, thus inflating their spending. Germany has clarified that its pledge includes predictive commitments and so may not translate into actual spending. This means that they count all money that will be committed in the 2010-2012 period, regardless of whether it is actually disbursed. As a consequence, figures are possibly significantly inflated by commitments which may not be delivered until after 2012.

The final 'middle rank' performer is the **UK**, which has committed a total of US \$1.7bn into the pot. Of this, extra funds for agriculture could represent an additional US \$110m, representing a 34 per cent increase over the past expenditure. However, with the new coalition government stepping out for its first international engagement at the 2010 Canadian G8, David Cameron's challenge will be to outline how they intend to deliver this money and honour their pledge.

Traditionally regarded as one of the EU's worst performers in terms of ODA levels (0.16 per cent of its GNI in 2009),²³ **Italy** made a pledge in line with its actual performance, which does not tally with its position as the EU's fourth largest economy. Official figures suggest that US \$180m out of the total of US \$428m pledged is additional to previous commitments.

Nonetheless, ActionAid's calculations show that there is little evidence of additional funds; if anything they represent a cut of US \$14.4m. It is also hard to see how Silvio Berlusconi is actually going to deliver increases amid overall widespread cuts to aid, without dipping into the aid purses of other sectors, such as health or education.

The total commitment made by **Japan** amounts to US \$3bn for the period 2010-2012. A large amount of Japan's giving falls into a number of categories; and it is unclear whether they relate directly to food security. And with no additional funds announced for agriculture, the pledge could actually translate into a significant reduction in aid to agriculture over the three years of the L'Aquila Initiative - as much as up to 71 per cent.

The **United States** stands out as the star performer of the L'Aquila pledge. Their US \$3bn commitment is the second largest after the European Union's, and a substantial portion is new money going to agriculture. Overall, Barack Obama's commitment could see US aid to agriculture rising by an impressive 74 per cent, along with a simultaneous tripling of support to nutritional programmes in the developing world. It is important to point out that, unlike many other of their donor colleagues, who counted a variety of dubious programmes and food security interventions in their pledges, the US have excluded some of their contributions to other hunger fighting initiatives. For instance, they have not counted substantial contributions to 'food aid' towards their L'Aquila pledge.

It must be noted, however, that these recent pledges are making up for a lot of lost time. The US has given historically low levels of support to any food and hunger programmes, apart from 'food aid' purchased from American agribusiness – which often made things worse for local farmers. The Obama Administration has initiated a long-overdue shift away from in-kind food aid, towards supporting poor countries to build their agricultural sector.

Obama has also sent good signals in terms of how the US intends to spend this money, with the US putting money behind country-led plans for agriculture through the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) outlined in Box Two, and through the newly-launched Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme (GAFSP) hosted in the World Bank. But we have yet to see whether or not this is fully delivered.

Box Two: African countries hold up their end of the bargain

African countries have made important commitments to agriculture and food security, notably through the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Plan (CAADP). CAADP is an African initiative which is based on country-owned 'compacts' for agriculture. The initiative also commits signatory countries to increasing spending on agriculture to 10 per cent of GDP and reaching an agriculture growth rate of 6 per cent. In return, donors would increase their spending behind these compacts.²⁴

As of April 2010, 16 countries had signed a CAADP compact and many more are moving towards implementation. Eight countries (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Niger and Senegal) are exceeding the budget target and ten countries met the 6 per cent growth target in 2008.²⁵

Sadly, donors are not doing their part to support this African home-grown initiative. Take Rwanda, one of the countries which has signed a compact. Rwanda remains short of US \$300 million of the US \$800 million needed to underwrite its 2020 agricultural investment plan. During the CAADP workshop in Kigali late last year donors pledged to provide this amount but as yet funds have not been forthcoming.²⁶

The L'Aquila commitment is made up of more than just G8 donors: a number of other significant donors are pledging into the pot too, including the EU, Austria, Sweden, Netherlands and Spain. Some of which appears to be new.

Official figures state that **Spain** made an additional commitment of US \$696m to be delivered over the three year period of the L'Aquila pledge. Spain is also one of only three countries to channel funds through the Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme. **Australia** has pledged US \$360m in extra money, which if delivered would give them a 50 per cent increase in aid to agriculture and bring their overall spending up to a respectable 6 per cent of overall aid spending on agriculture. However, somewhat oddly, this is pledged over a four year period.

The **European Union** pledged the single biggest amount (US \$3.8m) in L'Aquila. However, less than a fifth of this (US \$742m) is said to be new commitments. And the EU has only said that this is an estimation of future commitments – meaning we can't be sure if this will actually be spent. Unfortunately, the EU is actually decreasing its spending on the agricultural sector by as much as 46 per cent. Sadly, this means that they bring down the overall contributions of many others.

ActionAid's analysis of the L'Aquila Initiative has thrown-up a number of concerns. A muddle of announcements relating to different time periods and varying proportions of new money; lack of data and information; commitments which look likely to fall short of actual disbursements; and a mishmash of programmes and projects rather than the coordinated country-led approach that was promised - all makes it hard to judge how much is hope or hype.

4. MOVING FORWARD AND LEARNING LESSONS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST HUNGER

“To this end, we will partner with vulnerable countries and regions to help them develop and implement their own food security strategies ... Our action will be characterized by a comprehensive approach to food security, effective coordination, [and] support for country-owned processes and plans...”

“L'Aquila” Joint Statement on Global Food Security

How aid is delivered is also vital. The world has come a long way in making development partnerships more effective in areas such as education or health. By comparison, spending in agriculture is archaic. Worst of all, some agricultural aid cannot even be called aid.

A recent report by the Global Donor Platform for Rural Development exposes some fundamental problems with current agricultural aid policy, in that it is poorly coordinated, unpredictable and often does not support government plans.²⁷

The need to align aid behind country led plans instead of donor priorities is underlined by a disturbing pattern of seemingly random spending on projects that are not beneficial to food security and in some cases have dubious claims to be called aid.

Spain has provided US \$15m to a Spanish military contractor to provide Nicaragua's Navy with four patrol boats. According to official documents the boats are intended for the "monitoring of fishing resources" and have been reported as aid to "fishing policy and administration management". However, with the badly underequipped Navy under pressure to step up its efforts against drug traffickers and gun runners, it seems possible that these boats may find other uses in addition to the surveillance of fishing resources.²⁸

Certainly, the boats are unlikely to be of direct use to the 46 per cent of the Nicaraguan peasantry who struggle to feed their families. However, the cost of the boats dwarves Spain's contribution to anti-hunger programmes such as PESA, the government's special programme for food security, which has been named by the UN as one of the two best in the world.²⁹

Box Three: Support to tackling Avian Flu masquerading as aid to agriculture

- **Australia:** US \$0.08m in Indonesia and Vietnam for "the epidemiology, pathogenesis and control of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in ducks"; US \$0.13m for the "practical management strategies for avian influenza web-based implementation toolkit"; US \$0.17m for "strengthening capacity for field and laboratory surveillance for avian influenza in the Philippines"; US \$0.15m in Indonesia and US \$0.41m for "genetically resistant mouse strains of Avian influenza in China."
- **EC:** US \$1.3m to Asia and US \$0.7m for central Asia to be administered by the World Bank. US \$0.9m to Myanmar for the "prevention and control of avian and human pandemic influenza."
- **Spain:** US \$0.14m and US \$0.43m for flu surveillance in Maghreb and Egypt.

Germany has included US \$0.34 m on biofuels production in South Africa, as a contribution to food security, despite overwhelming evidence that the scramble for biofuels is diverting huge amounts of crop land away from food production. The links between biofuel production and hunger are now clearly acknowledged. However, not only do many donors continue to give heavy subsidies and incentives for biofuel use in their own countries, we find that Germany is even counting funding for biofuels as a contribution to 'food security'. The German government has also been counting a bizarre range of other items within their food security spending (see Box Four).

Meanwhile, a whole range of donors are reporting activities relating to dealing with avian flu as aid to agriculture. Some of this is supporting areas which could be broadly classified as supporting food security - such as supporting countries to diversify away from poultry. However, most of them are related to surveillance and control and should be more accurately classified as aid to the health sector (see Box Three).

However, things might be about to change. The endorsement of the CAADP process (see Box Two) by the G8 L'Aquila Summit has marked a shift in donor approach. And support to the initiative has increased across countries. The launch of the Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme by Spain, Canada and the US also holds potential to catalyse a more effective approach based on country plans, providing that the World Bank stays in the background and country priorities come to the fore.

ActionAid is calling on the G8 and their donor partners to learn lessons from their bad spending habits of the past when taking forward their L'Aquila commitments. They cannot continue to short change the world's poor through a patchwork of uncoordinated projects, some of which have little to do with fighting hunger.

Box Four: Germany's bizarre aid giving

In 2008, the German government spent a total of US\$6.4m of ODA money for 'Agriculture, forestry and fishing' on projects in the following areas:

- Studies on 'the active principles of microorganisms in sedimentary deposits (US\$0.15m, China)'
- Coal fire detection and extinction (US\$1.21m, China).
- Biofuels (US\$0.34m, South Africa).
- Improvement of degraded landscapes in China (US\$0.14m).
- Research on the fatigue of building pieces made of wood composites (US\$0.03m, China).
- Restoration of forest landscapes in Southern Caucasus (US\$3.8m).
- Support and research for the production of industrial machines (US\$0.67m, China)

The government also reported as 'basic nutrition projects' a total of US\$0.5m spent on:

- Odour control practices to increase the acceptance of food processing factories in urban areas of both in Germany and China (US\$0.5m).

None of these projects, most of them conducted in collaboration with German universities, can be linked to improvements on food security or agricultural improvement, let alone with priority beneficiaries such as smallholders or women.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Last year, G8 leaders took a bold step towards reversing the shocking increases in global hunger that have left nearly one in three children malnourished. So far, little of their commitments have been delivered and there is still no coordinated global effort that brings rich and poor countries together in the fight against hunger.

We know what is possible. Some countries have shown the way. Nowhere is this more true than in Malawi, where a new government in 2004, brought back public support to smallholder farmers in the form of input subsidies and guaranteed government purchases of a certain amount of maize, which was used to restock national grain reserves. The government doubled its expenditure on agriculture from 7.4 per cent of its budget to 14 per cent.

Between 2005 and 2007, a miracle occurred: Malawi went from a food deficit of 43 per cent to a food surplus of 57 per cent as productivity increased two-fold. Maize production nearly trebled and food prices for the urban poor dropped, while the incomes of small farmers also rose because of increased productivity. Malawi's economy has expanded an average of 6.6 per cent a year since 2004, while the percentage of people living on less than US \$1 a day has fallen to 40 per cent from 52 per cent. Per capita income rose to US \$237 per year from US \$175 over the same period.³⁰

Esnart Issa has experienced the transformation in her own family's life. Like many other women farmers in Malawi and across Africa, she is the head of her household and is responsible for her family's wellbeing. Since the programme started about three years ago, she is able to feed her family and even to sell some surplus maize.

"I rejoice that I get the coupons that enable me to buy subsidised fertiliser and seed. My grandchildren no longer go to school on empty stomachs. They are happy children – this makes me happy," says Esnart Issa.

We are now at a crossroads. On the one side stands a future of growing hunger and poverty. On the other, could be a future like the one that Esnart Issa and the Malawian government are building – one where Africa's farms flourish, not only in support of those living on them, but also helping to contribute to national and global food security.

To realise this vision, the G8 leaders must not only deliver their own L'Aquila pledges, but also mobilise far more countries to forge a truly global action plan in support of women and smallholder farmers. The Canadian summit, followed by the UN Millennium Development Goals high level summit in September, offer them a last chance to make a credible and ambitious contribution to freeing the world from hunger.

Recommendations

In Canada, the G8 must:

1. Establish a clear and transparent timeline for the delivery of the full US \$22bn pledged in L'Aquila.
2. Announce a plan to operationalise the coordinated, comprehensive and country-led approach promised in L'Aquila, so as to ensure that every dollar and Euro spent has the maximum impact on hunger.
3. Work with developing countries to ensure that the stated focus on smallholders and women is translated into reality and support is shifted to low-cost, sustainable techniques.
4. Pledge support for developing an action-oriented and funded global plan for ending hunger at the UN summit on the Millennium Development Goals in September 2010.

End Notes

¹ "L'Aquila" Joint Statement on Global Food

Security, [www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/LAquila_Joint_Statement_on_Global_Food_Security\[1\],0.pdf](http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/LAquila_Joint_Statement_on_Global_Food_Security[1],0.pdf)

² Donors have committed to disbursing \$22.2 billion as part of the L'Aquila initiative, surpassing the original promise of \$20 billion made at the L'Aquila G8 Summit.

³ L'Aquila" Joint Statement on Global Food Security,

[http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/LAquila_Joint_Statement_on_Global_Food_Security\[1\],0.pdf](http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/LAquila_Joint_Statement_on_Global_Food_Security[1],0.pdf)

⁴ UNICEF, 2008, *State of the World's Children*.

⁵ Black RE, Morris SS, Bryce J, 2003, "Where and Why are 10 Million Children Dying Every Year?", *The Lancet* 361:2226-2234; Black RE, Allen LH, Bhutta ZA, et al. for the Maternal and Child Undernutrition Study Group, 2008, "Maternal and Child Undernutrition: Global and Regional Exposures and Health Consequences," *The Lancet* 371: 243-260; FAO, 2002, "Reducing Poverty and Hunger, the Critical Role of Financing for Food, Agriculture, and Rural Development", paper prepared for the International Conference on Financing for Development Monterrey, Mexico,

18-22 March 2002. Rome: FAO. Bellagio Study Group on Child Survival, 2003, "Knowledge into Action for Child Survival", *The Lancet* 362: 9380 323 - 27

⁶ Taken from the Dfid, 2010, The neglected crisis of undernutrition: DFID's Strategy

<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/nutrition-strategy.pdf> and UNICEF, 2009, *State of the World's Children*, Special Edition

⁷ UNICEF, 2009, *State of the World's Children*, www.unicef.org/sowc09. UNICEF *State of the World's Children* 2009 reported 28 per cent of children as chronically hungry in 2000-2007, down from 31 per cent in the previous year's report. Due to the food financial crises, this small gain has most likely been reversed

⁸ P Hazell et al, 2007, *The Future of Small Farms for Poverty Reduction and Growth*, Washington DC: IFPRI.

⁹ World Bank, 2007, *World Development Report 2007: Agriculture for Development.*, Washington: World Bank

¹⁰ UN High-Level Task force on the Global Food Security Crisis, 2008, *Comprehensive Framework for Action*, <http://www.un.org/issues/food/taskforce/Documentation/CFA%20Web.pdf>

¹¹ United Nations, 2010, "Secretary General's Report: Keeping the promise: a forward-looking review to promote an agreed action agenda to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015", March.

¹² World Bank, 2008, "Agriculture and poverty reduction", *Agriculture for Development Policy Brief*, p.1

¹³ Omilola, B and Lambert, M. (2010) *Weathering the Storm Agricultural Development, Investment, and Poverty in Africa Following the Recent Food Price Crisis*. IFPRI Discussion Paper 00965

¹⁴ UN Economic Commission for Africa, 2007, *Africa review report on agriculture and rural development*, August.

¹⁵ Altieri, M., 2009, *Small Farms as a Planetary Ecological Asset*, Penang: Third World Network; World Bank, 2007, *World Development Report*.

¹⁶ Note this is in constant 2008 prices

¹⁷ Based on data from the OECD and OECD CRS database

¹⁸ The information used in our analysis has been obtained from the OECD Creditor Reporting System database and official sources at country level. The same purpose codes have been used to compare the L'Aquila pledges and past disbursements in order to ensure the comparability of the results. Figures from the OECD database have been transformed into 2008 constant prices to account for the effects of inflation.

¹⁹ The information obtained here on the L'Aquila pledges is based on announced figures or a draft document put together by donors at the L'Aquila Food Security Group Meeting in April and will form part of the G8 AWG report published just ahead of the G8 2010 Summit.

²⁰ The information used in our analysis has been obtained from the OECD Creditor Reporting System database and official sources at country level. The same purpose codes have been used to compare the L'Aquila pledges and past disbursements in order to ensure the comparability of the results. Figures from the OECD database have been transformed into 2008 constant prices to account for the effects of inflation.

²¹ See the G8 Gleneagles Communiqué, 2005.

²² Calculations made using 2004-2008 data from the OECD CRS Database. For figures in current prices see: CIDA (2010) Statistical Report on International Assistance. Financial year 2008-2009. Canadian International Development Agency, Gatineau

²³ OECD Development Assistance Committee press release and reference tables, 14/04/2010. Development aid rose in 2009 and most donors will meet 2010 aid targets.

²⁴ Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development targets. See www.resakss.org.

²⁵ The ONE DATA report, 2010, Monitoring the G8 Promises to Africa. <http://www.one.org/report/2010/en/>

²⁶ See, www.rnanews.com/economy/3412-spending-on-agriculture-will-remain-on-7-despite-regional-agreement-

²⁷ Agricultural sector experiences in implementing the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness Global Donor Platform for Rural Development, May 2008, p16. Global Donor Platform for Rural Development. Round Table 8: *Enhancing results by applying the Paris Declaration at sector level*, 2008, p12, see www.donorplatform.org.

²⁸ See for example, Jane's "Sentinel Security Assessment", February 2010: "The Nicaraguan Navy is a small coast guard force, with extremely limited capabilities following years of financial constraints. As many of its assets are unserviceable, and the ability of the navy to perform even minor coastal patrol functions is severely limited, the service will need a considerable amount of new equipment to be able to fulfill its duties properly. Those duties include fighting drug, arms and human trafficking, especially along the Atlantic coast. US State Department reports indicate that Nicaragua has become a major supplier of heroin to the US market and a transfer point for cocaine coming from Colombia." <http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes-Sentinel-Security-Assessment-Central-America-And-The-Caribbean/Navy-Nicaragua.html>

²⁹ Karla Jacobs, "Tackling malnutrition and hunger in Nicaragua: a battle on many fronts," 12 September 2009, http://www.tortillaconsal.com/hunger_nicaragua.html; ODAAnic, Official Development Assistance to Nicaragua Database, <http://nic.odadata.eu/>.

³⁰ ActionAid, 2010, Who's Really Fighting Poverty?

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ActionAid is an international anti-poverty agency working in over 40 countries, taking sides with poor people to end poverty and injustice together.

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